"continuity of the Way" (daotong 道統), a belief held by imperial Confucians that the correct Way is transmitted from an authoritative teacher to his disciple. 4 A discussion of Mou Zongsan's philosophy requires a short remark on some of the peculiarities of his writings. Mou's philosophy joins traditions as alien to each other as Kantian transcendentalism, the inclusivist classification of doctrines developed in Tiantai Buddhism, and a specific idea of the transmission of the Confucian Way, to name but a few of its most important ingredients. Not only does he frankly combine terms stemming from these extremely different contexts; sometimes he even goes so far as simply to identify them -even if, at times, he may signal that judging from their respective perspectives such a step may appear inadmissible. 5 Mou's tendency to refer to a broad variety of different sources and divergent uses of terms poses particular challenges to any translator, even to any reader, of his works. 6 Yet, although I readily admit that particular translational choices may be suggestive in the sense of favoring one interpretation over another, I am firmly convinced that the problems we encounter in reading Mou are caused not exclusively, not even mainly, by our inadequate translations of particular terms.
Mou's Claim on Kantian Autonomy and Its Consequences for Confucian Doxography
Mou's moral metaphysics owes much to his encounter with Kant's thought, in terms of both its Kantian vocabulary and its understanding of what is the highest aim of philosophy -namely the reconciliation of theoretical and practical reason.
One of Mou's most renowned students, Lee Ming-huei, highlights the tremendous role of Kantianism for Mou's interpretation of Confucianism revolving around a Kant-inspired notion of "autonomy." 7 According to Lee, Mou recognizes in the Mencian "heart" or "mind" (xin) the "philosophical-anthropological" framework of moral autonomy, as, still in Lee's presentation, this "heart" combines an a priori universalism with the unity of both the rational and the emotional. 8 Considering Lee's summary of the core of Mou's moral philosophy, insightful and correct in our view, we notice that Mou agrees with the conventions of imperial Neo-Confucianism 9 when he places the moral judgment of the Mencian "heart" at the core of his teaching. His innovation lies in his interpretation of this "heart" in terms of the philosophical notion of autonomy, a move with substantial and far-reaching consequences for evaluating the correct line of transmission of the Way.
In his endeavor to make Mou's thought accessible to a non-Chinese public -the passage referred to here is taken from a textbook in German -Lee Ming-huei translates its pivotal point into a familiar "Western" philosophical vocabulary: the Mencian "heart" here turns straightaway into the Kantian "moral subject," while the Confucian "moral principle" (li 理) is paraphrased by the Kantian expression of the "moral law." This equalization of terms allows Lee, certainly in line with his teacher's intention, to recast the famous phrase "xin ji li" 心即理 by the Song Confucian Lu Jiuyuan 陸九淵 (Xiangshan 象山) (1139-1193) in terms of eighteenth-century European moral philosophy, rendering it as "a unity of the moral subject and the moral law." 10 In the light of this interpretation of the Mencian "heart," Lu Xiangshan's motto suddenly appears as a claim of the moral autonomy of the subject: the "principle" to be found inside his or her genuine heart or mind is the moral law. If the principles of moral action do not exclusively arise from our moral consciousness, or -in Lee's much more suggestive Kantian paraphrase -if moral law does not arise from the moral subject, then this implies an outright heteronomy. 11 Precisely this flaw in Mou's view afflicts the competing "orthodox" school of Cheng Yi 程頤 (1033-1107) and Zhu Xi 朱熹 (1130-1200), which rejects the idea that our moral consciousness directly discovers these "principles" within itself, and instead argues that it only detects them in our engagement with the external world. 12 Mou's application of the Kantian notion of autonomy to the Mencian "heart," however problematic and controversial 13 in itself, elevates moral autonomy to the essence of the teaching of Confucius and the touchstone of its correct transmission. He provides what appears to be a philosophical criterion for reconstructing a doctrinal continuity. 14 This spelling-out of Mencian anthropology with the vocabulary of Kant proves double-edged. Glossing Confucian terms with Kantian concepts, Mou weaves a delicate texture of mutual correspondences and equivalences imbuing Kantian terms with a Confucian aura and vesting Kantian distinctions into the linguistic garment of Neo-Confucianism. However, renouncing comment on this process and its consequences, Mou leaves the intricate philosophical problems of such an equalization of Confucian and Kantian terms largely unaddressed. 15 As he leaves implicit the exact relationship between the two conceptual worlds, his hybrid Confucian-Kantian terminology inherits a significant lack of definition. The resulting ambiguity doubtless is calculated, as it is indispensable for Mou's erection of his lofty conceptual constructions. Yet, in the attempt to naturalize Kantian "moral autonomy" to Mencianism, this procedure patently fails. Mou here unwittingly thwarts the very property for which he holds Kantianism in so high esteem: in the process of its appropriation, "moral autonomy" loses both the a prioricity and universal validity of its Kantian model. 16 Mou's notion of "intellectual intuition" is designed precisely to warrant our insight into this moral autonomy. 17 However, allegedly a practical experience of the lived body, intellectual intuition is said to escape conceptual thought and propositional language. It can only be alluded to in the metaphorizing rhetoric of paradox. Mou's approach, therefore, renders his talk on autonomy ultimately inscrutable, at least conceptually. 18 The philosophical rampart he erects hermeticizes and mystifies his thought and eventually undermines its ability to speak in its own right. It is precisely this internalization and resulting incommunicability of moral autonomy that paves the way to the restoration of the daotong. The need to invoke the authority of the sage hence clearly responds to exigencies systematically brought about by the alleged content and particular design of Mou's philosophy.
Paradoxically -though possibly not inadvertently -Mou's strategy to recast the Confucian tradition in terms of critical philosophy results in its immunization against any familiar forms of criticism: whatever Mou finds with Kantian philosophy, it is quite obvious that it is not its universal call for critical evaluation that attracts him. In contrast to others, 19 I do not think that Mou failed to grasp the essentials of Kantian critique. I simply think that it just might have been a different aspect of Kantianism that aroused Mou's interest: the promise that it restrains the pretensions of theoretical reason and hence determines the limits of objective knowledge all by "making room for faith." 20 While Mou appreciated Kant's primacy of practical over theoretical reason, he simply refused to accept that critique cannot allow for any refuges inaccessible to its universal call for rational justification, and that providing such resorts undermines the very basis of the critical project.
Intellectual Intuition and Moral Practice
In Mou's view, pre-modern Confucians in their engagement in moral cultivation have actually experienced in their very practice an awareness of the "moral norm" (li 理) imparted to them by their human nature. 21 Their documents therefore bear witness to the truth that human beings indeed can have an intuitive insight into the fundamental reality of their moral autonomy -or, in Mou's terms, humans can have "intellectual intuition." 22 However, Mou is aware that the mere appeal to the authority of traditional writings along with his claim that these are to be read as documenting "intellectual intuition" are hardly convincing for those who either do not blindfoldedly accept tradition's authority or doubt that Mou's resort to this notion is an appropriate approach to these texts. He therefore sees the duty to substantiate his core claim that humans can have intellectual intuition, a task he has to fulfill on two different levels: that it is necessary for humans to be capable of intellectual intuition has to be established both in theoretical 23 and in practical 24 respects.
Stipulating the Theoretical Necessity of Intellectual Intuition
At the beginning of his discussion of moral intuition, Mou invokes the language of Kantianism to define morality as "acting according to the unconditional categorical imperative." 25 This categorical imperative, according to Kant, is emitted by our free will, a concept that Mou glosses with a number of Confucian terms like "genuine heart" (benxin 本心), "essential humanity" (renti 仁體), and "genuine knowledge" (liangzhi). 26 He holds that all these various expressions coincide in pointing to the "transcendental foundation of moral action," which constitutes the "nature" (xing) of the human being. 27 In an attempt to explain why the categorical imperative arises from free will, Mou writes that "only if it is like this, its [= of the free will] imperative becomes something unconditioned and categorical. And this is what Confucians designate as that which essential substance commands (xingti zhi suo ming 性體之 所命)." 28 Mou, eventually replacing the Kantian term of the free will by its alleged Confucian equivalent, goes on to state that "if essential substance were a limited concept, it would be impossible that the imperative that it [= essential substance] emits would not be [somehow] restricted." 29 Mou here appeals to Kant's notion of categoricity, 30 which excludes calling categorical an imperative emitted by something that is itself conditioned. It is essential to the action commanded by the categorical imperative that it is executed exclusively because it is good. Would it be conditioned, it would depend on causes other than its being good. For Mou, the possibility of a categorical imperative hence requires the possibility of an unconditioned Good. Without the categorical imperative, the unconditioned Good with its various designations ("nature," "essential substance," "free will," "moral law") would forfeit its potential to guide our actions. Genuinely good actions would prove impossible. Therefore, the categorical imperative is a viable concept only if acting good is really possible. And if good actions can actually be realized, then the unconditioned Good as their exclusive source must be real, too.
Under its functional aspect as the "transcendental foundation" of our human nature, Mou calls this unconditioned and hence absolute Good by names like "nature" (xing) and "essential substance" (xingti). When viewed from the normative perspective of determining our actions, he identifies it with the moral law -which, we remember, he equalizes to the Confucian "moral principle" (li). If, thus, the unconditioned foundation would be impossible, the "autonomy" 31 of the moral law would be mere illusion. 32 Mou, aware that something unconditioned or absolute cannot be grasped in what Kant calls discursive language, considers the reality of the moral action as proof to the reality of this absolute: intellectual intuition, the treasure of the Confucian tradition, in this view, is the key disclosing to us what we cannot recognize in conceptual terms. Our personal awareness, at some point, of really acting morally testifies to the actual reality of the unconditioned Good.
That the absolute Good can be witnessed through one's moral actions is thus precisely what the Confucian tradition of the "learning of the heart" is thought to warrant. It is from the vantage point of moral autonomy that the theoretical necessity that Mou invokes arises: assuming that the categorical imperative indeed has any bearing on our concrete actions presupposes the reality of its unconditioned source. This reality, however, cannot be conceived as the existence of an object that causes good action, as such an integration of the unconditioned Good into the realm of natural causality would presuppose its undue reification. It is precisely for this reason that it cannot be recognized theoretically, but only experienced practically. However, this practical experience is nothing else than the concrete action prompted by the categorical imperative. If this latter is to be a reality -and Mou is convinced that it is -one has to be able to recognize that a particular action is indeed triggered by it. And as the reality of this good action by the very concept of categoricity could not be caused by anything else than an unconditioned Good, this latter appears as a theoretical necessity. If the concept of categoricity therefore is to be more than mere figurative speech, what cannot be recognized theoretically still has to be assumed on theoretical grounds.
The essential character of the categorical imperative, presupposing the unconditioned Good that emits it, can only be disclosed to us in intellectual intuition, our spontaneous awareness in acting that what we are doing indeed is good. For this reason, intellectual intuition precisely by allowing us to capture the goodness of our actions equally testifies to the reality of the absolute Good. On theoretical grounds the "verification" of the reality of the categorical imperative, not recognizable theoretically, must be grasped in another way. And this way is our practical experience in actu of the good disclosed by intellectual intuition. The reality of morality amounts to the reality of the categorical imperative, and the reality of the categorical imperative presupposes intellectual intuition as our only possible means to verify it.
Anchoring autonomy in moral feeling, which seems to appear to him as the rock-solid ground of one of the most basic human experiences, instead of conceiving it in terms of what he considers mere conceptual speculation ultimately detached from the concrete reality of human life, Mou in a way suggests to place Kant back on his feet. Yet, even if we can reconstruct Mou's argument it becomes clear that his understanding of "moral autonomy" fundamentally departs from Kant, 33 for whom pure reason implies the necessary idea of a "causa noumenon," an unconditioned cause. Yet, as ideas of reason cannot find any evidence in objective knowledge, which relies on understanding and sensible intuition, they can only be of a regulative use. Pure reason is the "ratio cognoscendi" of the free will: reason makes available, in fact even requires, the thought of a first cause. At the same time, however, it makes it clear that there is no way of objectively recognizing such a cause. Nonetheless it obliges the empirical subject, which recognizes itself as a natural and hence heteronomously conditioned being, to think of free will as a causa noumenon of its actions, as by virtue of being a rational being it has the duty to act in accordance with reason. Without delving into the odds and ends of Kantian critique, we can recognize that Mou's concern to anchor the reality of the free will in an existential sense is entirely alien to Kant's notion of the free will. 34 Even more problematic is Mou's attempt to achieve this goal by claiming the possibility of intellectual intuition. Unlike Mou's insinuation, Kant's reason for holding that humans lack it most definitely is not that the Christian tradition of an anthropomorphic God hindered him from doing so. Kant's God is an ideal resulting from one of the ideas of pure reason, one of the notions of totality required by reason's inherent structure; and it is, at the same time, a postulate of practical reason. 35 Thus, there is no claim that God exists. Kant's position rather comes down to not much more than the requirement that we act as if God existed. It is essential to the Kantian critique that the realms of nature and morality are heterogeneous and that we cannot know about a real unity of both in the sense of the transcendental foundation allegedly provided by what Mou terms our moral "nature" (xing) or "essential substance" (xingti). 36 
The Practical Necessity of Intellectual Intuition
In his motivation of a practical necessity of intellectual intuition, Mou entirely leaves the confines of Kantianism. Trying to provide what he calls a "positive" notion of intellectual intuition, he presents three different aspects of it: the first pertains to its experience from the perspective of the empirical, that is, "unenlightened" subject; 37 the second refers to its being witnessed, in moral acting, from within; 38 and the third eventually relates to its cosmological dimension. 39 At one point, Mou compares the first aspect of intellectual intuition to a light projected into our limited human lives by the unlimited heart 40 -arising as what we experience as a moral feeling, it urges us to action. As it often pushes against our habits and routines, we tend to experience it as untimely, and we may even feel extremely reluctant to follow its guidance. Directing our attention to the distress and need for help of the people next to us, it is also a bitter experience bringing to our consciousness the suffering of the world. What is more, the lucid moments of moral clarity flashing up in intellectual intuition pass by. There may well be a theoretically infinite approximation to the absolute moral heart that is the source of that light. The source itself, however, remains out of reach. In approximating the unlimited heart, we are said to progress in leaps, from one moment of illumination to the next. In this process we thus reach what Mou terms ever higher degrees of "intensity" (qiangdu 強 度) of moral alertness.
The second aspect of intellectual intuition refers to the very moment of our enactment of the moral law. Here, the sorrow and distress of ourselves and our neighbor give way to the experience of happiness brought along by the certainty of partaking in realizing what is right and good. For a moment, the cleavages and conflicts characterizing our daily environment are suspended. Mou characterizes this intellectual intuition "from within" as a "qualitative" experience of the infinite heart, which he terms "subjective." During this innermost experience of moral acting, the unlimited heart can indeed be realized in its genuine significance. 41 The third aspect of intellectual intuition eventually purports that our moral deeds do in fact improve the world, that they possess a creative power that changes the real world of our everyday lives. It guarantees that the sphere of moral practice witnessed in intellectual intuition is indeed connected to the natural world of physical objects.
Although Mou quite consistently sticks to this tripartite schema throughout his discussion of intellectual intuition, he does not actually fill this notion with the positive content he so often boasts. Mou tells us something about the place of intellectual intuition in moral self-cultivation and about the problems of moral agency. But out of all things the purported content of intellectual intuition, the specific values it allegedly discloses, remains sealed off in the externally inscrutable confines of introspection.
Intellectual Intuition and Moral Cultivation
Independently of these difficulties in coming to terms with the specificities of Mou's notion of intellectual intuition, it is clear that he assigns it the crucial role in moral self-cultivation. As Mou presents the matter, accessing the genuine heart in flashes of intellectual intuition has a reinforcing effect on our moral improvement. Mou maintains that experiencing moments of intellectual intuition makes us more and more responsive to our moral feeling, turning us into ever more efficient agents of free will. 42 What he does not give is an account of how we are able to recognize that, at a certain point, we can be sure that we are indeed intellectually intuiting.
Fortunately, however, Mou provides a concrete example of how he thinks single moral actions are prompted by the genuine heart: Moral action coincides with the manifold (zaduo 雜多) [of experience], and self-activity (ziwo huodong 自我活動) coincides with the activity of the lucid awareness (mingjue 明 覺) of moral nature. 43 Here, the activity of lucid awareness . . . is one's reflexive awareness (nijue 逆覺) that its [= the substantial humaneness of the genuine heart] command urges one to realize without fail (bu rongyi de 不容已的) various kinds of actions (xingshi 行事). 44 In this passage, Mou determines "intellectual intuition" not as an awareness that there is such a substantial humanity, but rather as an actual awareness in the very moment of acting that right now one is unconditionally prompted to do so by this substantial humanity. The phrase captures the experience of being inevitably urged to action in an awareness that acting so is good. It is what Mou elsewhere determines as "genuine" (zhenzheng de 真正的) intellectual intuition 45 and what corresponds to the second aspect discussed above.
When Mou illustrates how the genuine heart drives the individual agent to moral action, his examples show the serious difficulties of his conception of intellectual intuition. In a comment on an interpretation of the Mencian "genuine knowledge" (liangzhi) by Wang Yangming 46 Mou writes: Seeing one's father, one spontaneously knows about filial piety; in view of one's elder brother, one spontaneously knows about one's respect toward his older brother; coming across an unbearable situation, one simply acts, as one cannot bear it; in a shameful situation, one cannot but feel ashamed. All these are virtuous actions (dexing 德行) [sic! ]. In all these cases one obeys the command of the genuine heart's substantial humaneness, and each time these actions are but free spontaneity of the substance of moral nature. Seeing one's father, one shows piety in one's conduct. This is then an action. "Spontaneously to know filial piety" simply means that from the lucid awareness of the genuine heart of substantial humaneness one spontaneously knows that one has to act in a filial manner. In this, the genuine heart emits the imperative that one "needs to be filial." . . . To know filial piety is to be filial. . . . All this is the spontaneous freedom of the substance of moral nature. This free emission of an imperative by substantial moral nature at the same time spontaneously manifests itself in different actions (xingshi 行事). It is not a void (kongxuan 空懸) imperative. 47 This illustration of Mou's free will at work confirms our suspicion that his "substantiation" of the "categorical imperative" is at odds with Kant's respective concept. It seems that he pays a heavy price for this adaptation of the original notion. It may well help him to envision a possibility of conceiving of values as being sponta neously disclosed to us in a kind of self-implementing moral behavior. His concluding remarks on the "void" character of Kant's categorical imperative show that he does not appreciate the value of its merely formal character. An ethics based on mutually non-contradictory maxims precisely due to its purely formal design allows individual subjects to formulate their own preferences, all by preserving an overarching principle restricting their freedom and preventing it from turning into arbitrariness. And it keeps room for the individual subjects to decide on ethical issues. In contrast, freedom in Mou's sense is but self-causation. For the empirical subject, this freedom is only available if it is absorbed in the moral substance of the universe. In moral action, the agency of the empirical individual entirely disappears. Moral acts as conceived by Mou in the passage above are quasi-automatically instantiated by a force that is alien to the non-enlightened empirical subject. In a way Mou may thus succeed in saving the idea of substantial values and the traditional morals that propagate them, but he does so at the expense of any viable concept of genuine ethical choice.
For Mou, the empirical self is the effect of a reductionist self-conception. 48 In order to be free it has to sacrifice the illusion of essentially being an individual entity opposed to others and to coalesce with actual substance, which by its very spontaneity is free and self-caused. The spontaneous moral act unmasks the reductionist nature of one's empirical self-conception as an individualized self and unveils an awareness of partaking in a moral activity that transcends the allegedly self-imposed and artificial borders of the self. This kind of pure activity is what remains of reality if it is experienced in a way that suspends all the dismembering effects of the differentiating modes of cognition -it is the substantial and essential unity of everything, a unity that according to Mou can only be experienced in the actuality of the moral act. 49 Summarizing what has so far been said on the ability of human beings to experience intellectual intuition, we can basically distinguish two different modes of how the empirical self is said to be able to access substantial humanity. First, substance can be witnessed in a mode of reflexive awareness (nijue). Second, it can impose itself on the empirical self as a categorical imperative when realizing itself in spontaneous moral activity. Both are interrelated in that Mou holds that the power of substance to realize itself in a person's moral activity increases, as his or her experiences of witnessing substance in reflexive awareness multiply. Mou thus presents a doctrine of Confucian self-cultivation partly redressed in the guise of a Kantian vocabulary. 50 We conclude that occasional contentions 51 that Mou develops his claim for the necessity of intellectual intuition from inside a Kantian framework are untenable. 52 Quite to the contrary, Mou's criticism, rather than accrediting the essential conceptual framework of Kant's approach, involves a downright conflation of a number of distinctions essential to appreciating Kant's argument. 53 Most alarming to Mou should be that by his "substantialization" of the "transcendental" foundation of morality he -possibly unwittingly -tears down the only formally warranted universal and unconditional character of moral autonomy, doubtless one of his most cherished aspects of Kant's system. As that foundation becomes a matter of belief rather than rational argument, Mou unwittingly is trapped back in dogmatism.
Gestures of Authority: Transmitting the Incommunicable
Mou's case is probably less unfavorable with his arguments for the practical neces sity of intellectual intuition. It has emerged from the preceding discussion that what Mou appeals to by this notion is nothing else than the crucial role of moral feeling for acting good. In this he seems to address a genuine problem of Kantianism, one that is comprehensible even without Mou's metaphysical presuppositions: how is genuinely moral, that is, autonomous, action possible if, by our very nature as empirical beings, we are inevitably heteronomously determined? In addressing the problem of the moral feeling in Kant's work as a crucial issue, Lee Ming-huei has thus plausibly identified an aspect of Mou's moral metaphysics that may provide a possible vantage point for a Confucian criticism of Kantian ethics, a concern, Lee emphasizes, shared by the "majority" of German ethicians after Kant. 54 However, granting this point does not affect our observation that Mou's talk on intellectual intuition is marked by a flamboyant lack of content, which, in the worst case, might be interpreted in terms of a strategy to protect traditional values from being critically challenged.
Possibly the most vexing consequence of Mou's interpretation of the moral feeling as intellectual intuition, however, seems to be that the empirical subject -and hence what carries, in his view, the entire apparatus of cognitive representation -is in a sense suspended in moral acting. The empirical subject, thus "turning" into a moral agent, may well intuitively know that what he or she is doing is good. But at the same time, he or she loses the possibility of understanding it: if Mou is right, the content of moral consciousness simply evades propositional language and conceptual thought. 55 Mou's emphasis on the moral feeling reflects a complete internalization not only of our awareness of morality but also of the criteria for whether a particular act can count as good. This leaves moral values and evaluations essentially incommunicable. They prove to be neither verbalizable nor criticizable. 56 As we announced at the beginning, Mou's intellectual intuition hence places the centerpiece of his moral philosophy, the genuine heart and the essential values that it implies, into a space beyond the linguistic, cognitive, and conceptual reach of the empirical subject. Intellectual intuition and what it unveils become something entirely esoteric and can only be shared with the outsider by means of testimony or confession.
Bereft of any means to actually understand, let alone critically verify, what the insider, the Confucian, is telling him, the validity of the testimony for the outsider moves from the content of the claim to the person uttering it. In this way, intellectual intuition is pivotal for restoring the authority of the teacher and of the traditional interpretation of the continuity of the Way.
What is more, only if we assume that the Confucian teacher knows in a fundamentally different way than we do -not only about himself but also about his counterpart -and that his student, too, has the ability to access this different way of knowing, can we conceive of a viable concept of the transmission of the Way: the first condition warrants that the teacher is in possession of a criterion not only for deciding whether he himself is actually intellectually intuiting, but also for judging if his vis-à-vis, too, is partaking in this experience of intellectual intuition. The second one guarantees that the student is in a position to understand what his teacher means when he accords to him the ability to engage correctly in intellectual intuition. Although we have to suspect such a way of communication, we must at the same time accept that it has to remain unintelligible for us as long as we do not have intellectual intuition ourselves. As outsiders we either simply believe that there is something essential in talking about intellectual intuition and its transmission, or we refuse to accept this kind of arcane communication, which necessarily remains senseless for us.
Or, to adopt a remark by Schopenhauer on Schelling's philosophy of identity: for those who lack intellectual intuition all expositions about it "must remain as a book sealed with seven seals. 5 -Cf., e.g., Mou Zongsan, Xianxiang yu wuzishen (Taibei: Xuesheng Shuju, 1990), "Xu" (Preface), where, on p. 16, he suggests that Kant's "free will," Confucian "innate knowledge of the Good" (liangzhi 良知), the Daoists' "empty and quiet heart" (xuyi er jing de dao xin 虛一而靜的道心 -the expression itself is taken from Xunzi chap. 21), and the "pure mind of svabhāva" (zixing qingjing xin 自 性清淨心) in the Buddhist Tathāgatagarbha-sūtra equally belong to the "level of substance" (bentijie de 本體界的) and hence point out one and the same thing in spite of their peculiar linguistic form. Mou speaks about intellectual intuition in terms of a "lucid activity of the substantial humanity of the fundamental heart itself" (benxin renti zishen zhi mingjue huodong 本心仁體自身之明覺活動). Although Mou does not regard empirical knowledge and the empirical subject that is said to be its bearer as outright illusionary, he clearly regards them as secondary with respect to the "fundamental heart" and its "genuine knowledge of the good," the empirical self arising from what Mou calls the latter's "self-negation" (ziwo kanxian 自我坎陷). , proposing that Mou, in spite of crediting "traditional" Chinese thought for this distinction, in fact adopts a similar opposition established by Zhang Dongsun. Mou here terms the ordinary way of thinking of the world in terms of objects and their relations as "going with the flow," or shun, whereas the opposite direction of self-reflection assumed to disclose both the transcendental subject and transcendent substance is called "turning against the flow," or ni. This approximation of the notions of "subject" and "substance" might help explain the difficulty of finding a precise equivalent for ni. What is essential to its meaning is that it is thought to express an inversion of the direction of one's ordinary thinking -turning away from the objects, back to the subject and/or substance. In principle, it seems that this "turn" can happen both in conscious contemplation or, inadvertently, by one's being strongly urged to moral action by the moral heart -identified 43 -A literal translation could just as well oppose here two subjects of activity: the self on the one hand and substance and nature on the other. In what follows it will become clear that such a translation can be misleading if it is interpreted in a way suggesting that the two subjects are entities. Rather, it is clear from Mou's epistemology that both the "self" and any notion of a hypostatized "substance" are the result of cognitive constructions -rather than proper agents. I think that we have to read this passage in the sense that it is in moral activity that one becomes aware that what one took to be one's own self dissolves. This activity itself is the underlying unity of the cosmos -both its substance, as it is what remains after all individualizing and hence truncating activity of the cognitive mind is suspended, and its creativity, as it is the natura naturans, because it is through moral activity that the world of things -the natura naturata -is changed into a better place. This shows that Mou imagines "moral knowledge" as employing "empirical knowledge" as an instrument, the latter being the means by which moral knowledge realizes itself. This means that one can well describe what happens in a moral act: one can name the persons involved, describe their interaction, and so on. However, this level entirely belongs to the understanding and its analytical language. Insofar as they are moral, insofar as they are caused by the substantial heart, however, one only can know about these actions through intellectual intuition, and there is no apt language for directly referring to this level of reality.
-Mou

-The
Chuanxilu records a dialogue between Wang Yangming and Xue Kan that nicely illustrates this problem. Xue desperately asks for criteria to decide whether some action is good or bad. Wang, unable to provide such a criterion, eventually relegates him to asking his own heart or conscience. This speechlessness of the teacher with regard to the guiding moral principle also shows the danger of anomy lingering in this kind of internalization of moral judgments. For a translation see Chan, Instructions for Practical Living, pp. 63-65.
